Zentralbankpolitik und Zentralbankautonomie: Spielt die Unabhängigkeit eine Rolle?
AbstractA theoretical model is developed to describe the behavior of dependent and independent central banks. In an empirical test, the reaction functions of six central banks of industrial countries with different degrees of independence are estimated using an error correction framework. In shock simulations the reactions to an increase in inflation and a decrease in capacity utilization are compared. Contrary to the predictions of the theoretical model, there appears to be a difference only in response to a rise in inflation; there is no systematic difference, however, in the policy of dependent and independent banks following a decline in capacity utilization.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 710.
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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