Profits in pure Bertrand oligopolies
AbstractThis paper demonstrates that the Bertrand paradox does not hold if cost functions are strictly convex. Instead, multiple equilibria exist which can be Pareto-ranked. The paper shows that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium may imply profus higher than in Cournot competition or may even sustain perfect cartelization. The potential scope for implicit collusion is discussed for the case that the Pareto-dominant noncooperative equilibrium does not support perfect cartelization. Due to multiple non-cooperative equilibria, the discussion involves finitely repeated Bertrand games as well. The paper discusses several strategies which may support implicit collusion. 1t develops the notion of punishment-proofness, and it demonstrates that strongly renegotiationproof equilibria exist for sujficiently high discount factors. Finally, extensions are discussed which cover Stackeiberg leadership, fixed and sunk costs and endogenous market structures.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 703.
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Bertrand competition; Bertrand paradox; implicit collusion; renegotiationproofness; punishment-proofness;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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