On international compensations for environmental stocks
AbstractThis paper sheds some light on the possible implications of compensations which are paid for the maintenance of an environmental stock. It shows that serious complications can arise if the resource-owner can vary the compensation price. In that case, extraction-driven stock preservation policies can conflict with compensation-driven ones and imply instability. Whether compensation policies can neglect this aspect depends crucially on the credibility of sticky compensation prices.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 580.
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Frank Stähler, 1996. "On International compensations for environmental stocks," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(1), pages 1-13, July.
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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