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Foreign direct investment and the risk of expropriation

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  • Thomas, Jonathan
  • Worrall, Tim

Abstract

Foreign direct investment accounts for a considerable proportion of international capital flows. In 1986 the flow of foreign direct investment from developed market economies to developing countries was $12.5 billion or roughly one-half of all private capital flows from the developed to the developing nations (and roughly one-quarter of the flow of all foreign direct investments). Its significance for developing countries may even grow in the future as debt is swapped for equity (see Pollio and Riemschneider, 1988). The most important sector in volume term is the manufacturing sector, the concern of this paper. In 1978 total stocks of manufacturing foreign direct investment accounted for roughly two-thirds of the total in less developed countries, with just one-eighth devoted to the extractive industries (see Stopford and Dunning, 1983, p.22).

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Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 411.

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Date of creation: 1990
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Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:411

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  1. Doyle, Christopher & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1984. "Taxation of Foreign Multinationals: A Sequential Bargaining Approach to Tax Holidays," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 25, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Kobrin, Stephen J., 1987. "Testing the bargaining hypothesis in the manufacturing sector in developing countries," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(04), pages 609-638, September.
  3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1985. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 397, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Long, Ngo Van, 1975. "Resource extraction under the uncertainty about possible nationalization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 42-53, February.
  5. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-59, April.
  6. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  7. Bond, Eric W & Samuelson, Larry, 1986. "Tax Holidays as Signals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 820-26, September.
  8. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1982. "A Theory of Expropriation and Deviations From Perfect Capital Mobility," NBER Working Papers 0972, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
  10. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
  11. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July.
  12. Asheim, G.B. & Strand, J., 1989. "Long-Term Union-Firm Contracts," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- 10-89, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  13. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June.
  14. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1988. "Self-enforcing Wage Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 541-54, October.
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