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Government Ideology in Donor and Recipient Countries: Does Political Proximity Matter for the Effectiveness of Aid?

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  • Axel Dreher
  • Anna Minasyan
  • Peter Nunnenkamp

Abstract

Political proximity between donor and recipient governments may impair the effectiveness of aid by encouraging favoritism. By contrast, political misalignment between donor and recipient governments may render aid less effective by adding to transaction costs and giving rise to incentive problems. We test these competing hypotheses empirically by considering the political ideology of both governments along the left-right spectrum in augmented models on the economic growth effects of aid. Following the estimation approach of Clemens et al. (2012), we find that aid tends to be less effective when political ideology differs between the donor and the recipient

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File URL: https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/government-ideology-in-donor-and-recipient-countries-does-political-proximity-matter-for-the-effectiveness-of-aid/KWP_1870.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1870.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:1870

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Keywords: aid effectiveness; economic growth; politics and aid; government ideology;

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  1. Axel Dreher, 2009. "IMF conditionality: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 233-267, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Lskavyan, Vahe, 2014. "Donor–recipient ideological differences and economic aid," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 345-347.

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