Why Donors of Foreign Aid Do Not Coordinate: The Role of Competition for Export Markets and Political Support
AbstractDevelopment assistance has been criticized for a lack of coordination between aid donors. This paper argues that competition for export markets and political support prevents donor countries from closer coordination of aid activities. To test these hypotheses, we perform logit and fractional logit estimations for a large sample of recipient countries and aid activities since the early 1970s. Our empirical results reveal that export competition between donors is a major impediment to aid coordination. Tough less conclusive, we also find some evidence that donors’ competition over political support prevents them from coordinating aid activities more closely
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1825.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2013
Date of revision:
Development aid; donor coordination; trade interests; export similarity; UN voting;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
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