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The Allocation of German Aid: Self-interest and Government Ideology

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  • Axel Dreher
  • Peter Nunnenkamp
  • Maya Schmaljohann

Abstract

We investigate the importance of geo-strategic and commercial motives for the allocation of German aid to 138 countries over the 1973-2010 period. We find that geo-strategic and – less robustly – commercial motives matter. When we relate geo-strategic and commercial motives to the political color of the German government in general, and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Federal Foreign Office in particular, we find their importance to increase under socialist leadership. Socialist leadership also decreases the amount of aid commitments, controlled for other factors

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1817.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:1817

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Keywords: aid allocation; government ideology;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Viktor Brech & Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "Donor Ideology and Types of Foreign Aid," CESifo Working Paper Series 4314, CESifo Group Munich.

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