Ist die Währungsunion zu retten? Für einen anreizeffizienten Krisenmechanismus
AbstractAre the measures of the European Stability Mechanism sufficient for preventing further debt crises similar to those in Greece and Portugal? Definitively not, because private investors still enjoy rather high interest rates of dubious government bonds without being adequately involved in bearing the risks. The paper argues that government bonds of indebted countries should undergo a substantial haircut at the expense of private investors. In turn, the devaluated bonds should be guaranteed by the community of Euro countries. An essential precondition for these measures to work is an appropriate banking regulation which prevents systemic banks from destabilizing entire economies when going bust. Neither the provisional nor the permanent European Stability Mechanism meet these requirements of an incentive efficient rescue plan
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1690.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision:
European Monetary Union; Debt Mechanics; Brady Bonds;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
- E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2011-04-02 (Central Banking)
- NEP-GER-2011-04-02 (German Papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wolfgang Schäuble & Jürgen Stark & Clemens Fuest & Christian Fahrholz & Michael Eilfort & Verena Mertins, 2011. "EU-Rettungsschirm: Folgt der Einstieg in eine Transferunion?," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 64(03), pages 03-20, 02.
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- Wolfgang Franz & Clemens Fuest & Martin Hellwig & Hans-Werner Sinn, 2010. "A Euro Rescue Plan," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(2), pages 101-104, 07.
- Hans-Werner Sinn & Kai Carstensen, 2010. "Ein Krisenmechanismus für die Eurozone," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 63, pages 01-17, November.
- Baumgarten, Matthias & Klodt, Henning, 2010. "Die Schuldenmechanik in einer nicht-optimalen Währungsunion," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 45568, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
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