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Common Consequence Effects with Pricing Data

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Author Info

  • Ulrich Schmidt
  • Stefan T. Trautmann

Abstract

This paper presents an experimental study analyzing common consequence effects with binary choice, willingness-to-pay (WTP), and willingness-to-accept (WTA). Consistent with previous research we do not find clearcut evidence of fanning out in the absence of certainty effects. Violation rates of EU are more pronounced for WTP and WTA than for choice data. Moreover, there is a strong tendency for violations in the direction of fanning out. Our results reinforce the significance of common consequence effects and provide support for the operation of cancellation in prospect theory

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File URL: http://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/publication.2010-04-06.3683857286/kwp_1610.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1610.

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Length: 6 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:1610

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Keywords: Common consequence effects; fanning out; WTP; WTA; cancellation;

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Cited by:
  1. James C. Cox & Vjollca Sadiraj & Ulrich Schmidt, 2011. "Paradoxes and Mechanisms for Choice under Risk," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2011-07, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, revised May 2012.

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