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How Global Rules are established and stabilized

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Author Info
Horst Siebert
Abstract

This paper analyzes how international rules are established and stabilized, i.e. how an international institutional order develops. Rules emerge mainly through learning from negative experience and serve to reduce transaction costs. The paper looks at mechanisms that stabilize rule systems, at bargaining procedures for cooperation gains, dispute settlement, sanctions, side payments, self-enforcing contracts, waivers and regional integrations within a multilateral order. In addition it analyzes the prevention of negative spillovers, international courts and global public goods.

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File URL: http://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/how-global-rules-are-established-and-stabilized/kap1388.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1388.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:1388

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Related research
Keywords: International rules; transaction costs; institutional competition; gains from cooperation; bargaining for cooperation gains; positive mechanisms; dispute settlement; sanctions; side payments; self-enforcing contracts; negative spillovers; international courts; global public goods;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General
F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
N00 - Economic History - - General - - - General
P00 - Economic Systems - - General - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Barro, Robert J, 1986. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Rules versus Discretion," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(380a), pages 23-37, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Drusilla K. Brown & Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M Stern, 2001. "Multilateral, Regional, and Bilateral Trade-Policy Options for the United States and Japan," Working Papers 469, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Kemp, Murray C. & Wan, Henry Jr., 1976. "An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 95-97, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-24.

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