Monetary Policy Committee Size and Inflation Volatility
Abstract
Previous research on the optimal size of a monetary policy committee (MPC) focused on theoretical analyses and experimental studies. These studies suggest that the ideal monetary policy committee may not have many more than five members. In this paper we conduct an empirical cross-country study to explore whether there is a link between the size of an MPC and inflation volatility. The analysis for 75 countries which have adopted MPCs provides some support for the above suggestion: countries with less than five MPC members tend to have larger deviations from trend inflation than MPCs with five members; raising the number of MPC members above five does not contribute to a further reduction in volatility.Download Info
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Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1377.Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:1377
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Related research
Keywords: Monetary Policy Committee; Inflation Volatility;Other versions of this item:
- Szilard Erhart & Harmen Lehment & Jose Vasquez Paz, 2010. "Monetary policy committee size and inflation volatility," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 411-421, December.
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-09-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2007-09-24 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2007-09-24 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2007-09-24 (Monetary Economics)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker, 2008.
"Too many cooks? Committees in monetary policy,"
Discussion Papers
2008/8, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsc, 2011. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 452-475, October.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2008. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," KOF Working papers 08-195, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2008. "Too many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2274, CESifo Group Munich.
- Szilárd Erhart & Jose Luis Vasquez-Paz, 2008. "Determinants of the size of a monetary policy committee: Theory and cross country evidence," Working Papers 2008-001, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
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