Economic and Political Governance in Germany's Social Market Economy
AbstractGermany’s system of economic and political governance strongly relies on group decision-making and consensus to solve economic issues. This approach relates to a wide spectrum of decisions, including the social partners with the trade unions and the employers’ associations in wage formation, the trade unions in the governance of firms through codetermination and the workers’ councils in the operation of firms, but also to relationship banking and to the steering of the university system by codetermination and by a governmental planning approach. In addition, in the governance of government and its federal structure, mechanisms of consensus are an important feature, above all through the joint responsibility of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in law-making. Distributive federalism is another expression of the consensus mechanism. Looking at all these mechanisms, it is surprising how strongly the market economy is restrained in Germany.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1207.
Length: 57 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Codetermination; governance; consensus; group decisionmaking; governance of the universities; governance of government; voting system; Bundesrat and law-making; distributive federalism;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
- J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hall, Peter A. & Soskice, David (ed.), 2001. "Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247752.
- Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999.
"Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 169-82, January.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," NBER Working Papers 6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dieter Stribny).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.