Regulatory Choices and Commitment � Challenges for Electricity Market Regulation in Kosovo
AbstractThis paper aims at describing the choices to be made in selecting and implementing a reform model for the electricity industry and to derive some implications for the situation in Kosovo. The paper argues that the appropriate reform model depends on the circumstances in the considered jurisdiction. Especially in small and less developed electricity systems a dilemma may emerge: the technical circumstances suggest the implementation of a model with few competitive elements, whereas political circumstances urge for a competition-oriented model. Hence, especially in small systems, a delicate trade-off emerges that significantly complicates the decisions to be made. This is obviously relevant for Kosovo. An international opening of KosovoÂ’s electricity market may provide a solution to the dilemma. This international opening encompasses a reduction of state sovereignty for electricity regulation and a wide-reaching market opening for private investors and electricity traders.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1114.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2002
Date of revision:
Power sector; new institutional economics; liberalization; pool; privatization; regulation; restructuring; regulatory reform; single buyer; transition.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
- P3 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
- Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy
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