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Optionen einer effizienten Gestaltung der Arbeitslosenversicherung

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  • Hans H. Glismann
  • Klaus Schrader
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    Abstract

    Die internationale Diskussion der letzten Jahrzehnte hat zur Frage nach einer effizienten Gestaltung der Einkommenssicherung von Arbeitslosen eine Reihe von Vorschlägen hervorgebracht, wie die von Beenstock/Brasse, Feldstein /Altman, Grubel und Orzag/Snower. Sie werden dargestellt und bewertet. Als ökonomisch beste Lösung stellt sich ein reines Versicherungsmodell heraus. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit wird daher auf die besonders in Deutschland vorherrschenden Zweifel an der Versicherbarkeit des Arbeitslosigkeitsrisikos eingegangen; diese Zweifel sind zum Teil auch Gegenstand der Standardwerke zur Versicherungsökonomie. Es wird gezeigt, daß die Kerneinwände nicht tragfähig sind: "Moral hazard" und "Adverse selection" schließen die Versicherbarkeit des Arbeitslosigkeitsrisikos keineswegs aus. The paper is about the economically efficient design of financial transfers to the unemployed in a highly industrialized country. There have been quite a few contributions to this problem — for example by Beenstock/Brasse, Feldstein/ Altman, Grubel, Orzag/Snower — which are presented and discussed. It turns out that a true unemployment insurance would be the most efficient way to solve the transfer problem. The second part of the paper deals with often-raised objections against such a solution. For example, insurability is often denied on the ground that an unemployment insurance would be too expensive due to moral hazard and adverse selection. It is shown that neither moral hazard nor adverse selection are insurmountable obstacles to a private insurance market.

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    File URL: https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/optionen-einer-effizienten-gestaltung-der-arbeitslosenversicherung/kap1052.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1052.

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    Length: 49 pages
    Date of creation: Jun 2001
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:1052

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    Keywords: Arbeitslosenversicherung; Versicherungsökonomik; Moral Hazard; Adverse Selection;

    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Snower, Dennis J, 1994. "Converting Unemployment Benefits into Employment Subsidies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 65-70, May.
    2. Hans H. Glismann & Klaus Schrader, 2000. "Zur Reform der deutschen Arbeitslosenversicherung � Probleme und Lösungsansätze in der deutschen Literatur," Kiel Working Papers 995, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    3. Arnott, Richard J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1988. " The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 90(3), pages 383-413.
    4. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
    5. Michael G Faure, 1995. "The Limits to Insurability from a Law and Economics Perspective," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 20(4), pages 454-462, October.
    6. Orszag, Mike & Snower, Dennis J., 2002. "Unemployment Vouchers versus Low-Wage Subsidies," IZA Discussion Papers 537, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Martin Feldstein & Daniel Altman, 2007. "Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 21, pages 35-64 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:
    1. Rürup, Bert, 2005. "Arbeitslosenversicherung: Staatlich, privat oder gemischt? (Unemployment insurance * state-run, private or a combination of both?)," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 38(2/3), pages 373-382.
    2. Hans H. Glismann & Klaus Schrader, 2002. "Die Reform der deutschen Arbeitslosenversicherung vor dem Hintergrund ihrer Geschichte," Kiel Working Papers 1112, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    3. repec:iab:iabzaf:v:38:i:2/3:p:373-382 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. von Berchem, Sascha & Berthold, Norbert, 2004. "Reform der Arbeitslosenversicherung : Markt, Staat oder beides?," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge 70, Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg, Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbes. Wirtschaftsordnung und Sozialpolitik.

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