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Alternative Systeme der Arbeitslosenversicherung — Das Beispiel der Vereinigten Staaten und des Vereinigten Königreichs

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Author Info
Hans H. Glismann
Klaus Schrader
Abstract

Im Rahmen eines Vergleichs der amerikanischen und britischen Systeme der Arbeitslosenversicherung wird gezeigt, daß das amerikanische System, auch anders als das deutsche, eine negative Rückkopplung zwischen den Ausgaben für die Arbeitslosenversicherung und der Höhe der Freisetzung von Arbeitskräften aufweist ("experience rating"). Im Vereinigten Königreich gibt es keine Arbeitslosenversicherung im herkömmlichen Sinne: Die Einkommenssicherung bei Arbeitslosigkeit erfolgt durch die "National Insurance", die das gesamte System der sozialen Sicherung (einschließlich Gesundheitswesen und Alterssicherung) abdeckt. Als bemerkenswert wird herausgestellt, daß anders als etwa die vergleichbaren Analysen der deutschen Arbeitslosenversicherung — die sich vorwiegend mit der Angebotsseite des Arbeitsmarktes befassen — die amerikanische Literatur zu einem großen Teil an der Nachfrage nach Arbeit ansetzt.

Comparing the unemployment insurance systems of the United States and of the United Kingdom it is shown that the US unemployment insurance (UI) is the only system that provides for a negative feedback between UI expenditures and layoffs ("experience rating"). The UK has no specific UI: Unemployment benefits are paid by the "National Insurance" which also covers other elements of social security, such as health care and retirement payments. Focussing therefore on the US literature it turns out that a major part deals with the demand side of the labour market, whereas the German literature rather concentrates on the supply side.

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Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1032.

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Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2001
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Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:1032

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Related research
Keywords: Arbeitslosigkeit; Arbeitslosenversicherung; Deutschland; Vereinigte Staaten; Vereinigtes Königreich;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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  16. Topel, Robert H, 1983. "On Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 541-59, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1998. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 6686, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Osberg, Lars & Apostle, Richard & Clairmont, Don, 1986. "The Incidence and Duration of Individual Unemployment: Supply Side o r Demand Side?," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 13-33, March.
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  23. Murphy, Kevin M & Topel, Robert H, 1997. "Unemployment and Nonemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 295-300, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  25. Anderson, Patricia M & Meyer, Bruce D, 1993. "Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Layoff Incentives and Cross Subsidies," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(1), pages S70-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  27. Gritz, R Mark & MaCurdy, Thomas, 1997. "Measuring the Influence of Unemployment Insurance on Unemployment Experiences," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 15(2), pages 130-52, April.
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  32. David Card & Phillip B. Levine, 1998. "Extended Benefits and the Duration of UI Spells: Evidence from the New Jersey Extended Benefit Program," NBER Working Papers 6714, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  33. Laurence, Louise, 1991. "How Do Firm Characteristics Affect the Subsidies Provided by the Unemployment Insurance System?," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 23(9), pages 1529-34, September.
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    Other versions:
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