Optimal Tariffs on Exhaustible Resources: The Case of Quantity Setting
AbstractConstructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We consider two di erent leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by the exporting country. We numerically show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, both countries are better o if the importing country is a leader, but that the follower becomes worse o if the exporting country is a leader. Consequently, the world welfare is highest under the importing country's leadership and lowest under the exporting country's leadership.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 82.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2012
Date of revision: Feb 2012
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1-155 Uegahara Ichiban-cho, Nishinomiya, Hyogo 662-8501
Web page: http://www-econ.kwansei.ac.jp/~econ/index_e.html
More information through EDIRC
dynamic game; feedback Nash equilibrium; feedback Stackelberg equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- Kenji Fujiwara & Ngo Van Long, 2012. "Optimal Tariffs On Exhaustible Resources: The Case Of Quantity-Setting," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(04), pages 1240004-1-1.
- Kenji Fujiwara & Ngo Van Long, 2012. "Optimal Tariffs on Exhaustible Resources : The Case of Quantity Setting," CIRANO Working Papers 2012s-02, CIRANO.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L72 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-02-27 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2012-02-27 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2012-02-27 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-02-27 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kenji Fujiwara & Ngo Van Long, 2010.
"Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market Under Bilateral Monopoly,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- Kenji Fujiwara & Ngo Long, 2011. "Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 479-497, December.
- Kenji Fujiwara & Ngo Van Long, 2011. "Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University 76, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Sep 2011.
- Wirl Franz, 1994. "Pigouvian Taxation of Energy for Flow and Stock Externalities and Strategic, Noncompetitive Energy Pricing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Van Long Ngo, 2010. "A Survey Of Dynamic Games In Economics:," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., volume 1, number 7577.
- James L. Smith, 2008.
"World Oil: Market or Mayhem?,"
Working Papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
0815, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
- Rubio, Santiago J. & Escriche, Luisa, 2001.
"Strategic pigouvian taxation, stock externalities and polluting non-renewable resources,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 297-313, February.
- Santiago J. Rubio & Luisa Escriche, 1998. "- Strategic Pigouvian Taxation, Stock Externalities And Polluting Non-Renewable Resources," Working Papers. Serie EC, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones EconÃ³micas, S.A. (Ivie) 1998-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones EconÃ³micas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Ngo Van Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2009. "A dynamic pricipal-agent problem as a feedback Stackelberg differentioal game," Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics 0905, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Tahvonen, Olli, 1996. "Trade with Polluting Nonrenewable Resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, 9.
- Keutiben, Octave, 2014. "On capturing foreign oil rents," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 542-555.
- Michielsen, Thomas O., 2014. "Strategic resource extraction and substitute development," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 455-468.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Toshihiro Okada).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.