This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Testing Whether Field Auction Experiments are Demand Revealing in Practice

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jay R. Corrigan
Matthew C. Rousu

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Recent evidence suggests that participants’ misunderstanding of experimental auction mechanisms can systematically bias auction results. We present a simple technique for testing whether field auction participants fully understand the demand-revealing nature of the auction mechanism and, by extension, whether auction bids provide an unbiased estimate of participants’ willingness to pay.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://economics.kenyon.edu/corrigan/publications/Internal%20Validity.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Kenyon College, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0804.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ken:wpaper:0804

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://economics.kenyon.edu/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Jay Corrigan).

Related research
Keywords: demand revealing; experimental auctions; field experiments;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. List, John A & Shogren, Jason F, 1998. "The Deadweight Loss of Christmas: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1350-55, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Todd L. Cherry & Peter Frykblom & John List & Jason Shogren & Melonie Williams, 2002. "Laboratory Testbeds and Nonmarket Valuation: The Case of Bidding Behavior in a Second Price Auction with an Outside Option," Working Papers 02-13, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    Other versions:
  3. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1990. "Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1325-48, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. John List & Craig Gallet, 2001. "What Experimental Protocol Influence Disparities Between Actual and Hypothetical Stated Values?," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 20(3), pages 241-254, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, 2007. "What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 153-174, Spring.
  6. List, John A. & Margolis, Michael & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Hypothetical-actual bid calibration of a multigood auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 263-268, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. John A. List, 2002. "Preference Reversals of a Different Kind: The "More Is Less" Phenomenon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1636-1643, December. [Downloadable!]
  8. J.L. Lusk & J.A. Fox & T.C. Schroeder & J. Mintert & M. Koohmaraie, 2001. "In-Store Valuation of Steak Tenderness," Framed Field Experiments 0058, The Field Experiments Website.
  9. John A. List & Paramita Sinha & Michael H. Taylor, . "Using Choice Experiments to Value Non-Market Goods and Services: Evidence from Field Experiments," Natural Field Experiments 0052, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
  10. John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 961-972, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Glenn W. Harrison & Ronald M. Harstad & E. Elisabet Rutstr–m, 2004. "Experimental Methods and Elicitation of Values," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 123-140, 06. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS was launched in September 1997.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-1.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.