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Functional Quality Degradation of Software with Network Externalities

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Author Info
Jong-Hee Hahn () (Department of Economics University of Keele)

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Abstract

This paper considers a functional quality degradation of software with twoway features (such as reading and writing in word-processors). A software monopolist differentiates products by introducing a functionally down-graded version (e.g. the read-only version) by eliminating some functions of the full version. A simple two-type model is presented to explain the firm’s incentive to introduce a functionally down-graded version. It is shown that the functional quality degradation is an effective consumer screening device, especially when consumers’ valuation for each function is negatively correlated. With network externalities, the firm may wish to offer the down-graded good below cost or even free of charge in many cases (including the case where introducing the quality-degraded version does not involve a market expansion). The welfare consequence of this kind of quality degradation is generally ambiguous, and critically depends on how the total market size changes by the introduction of the quality-degraded version.

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File URL: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/wpapers/0012.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Keele University in its series Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) with number 2000/12.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision: Jan 2001
Publication status: Published in Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 54, Issue 2, June 2006, pages 253-268 (revised version with G. Csorba). [ doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2006.00282.x ]
Handle: RePEc:kee:keeldp:2000/12

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG - United Kingdom
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Postal: Department of Economics, Keele University, Keele, Staffordshire ST5 5BG - United Kingdom
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Web: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/cer/pubs_kerps.htm

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Related research
Keywords: Software; Network Externalities; Quality Differentiation; FunctionalDegradation.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Raymond J. Deneckere & R. Preston McAfee, 1996. "Damaged Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 149-174, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Choi, Jay Pil, 1994. "Network Externality, Compatibility Choice, and Planned Obsolescence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2), pages 167-82, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Bensaid, Bernard & Lesne, Jean-Philippe, 1996. "Dynamic monopoly pricing with network externalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 837-855, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Takeyama, Lisa N, 1994. "The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2), pages 155-66, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Adams, William James & Yellen, Janet L, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 475-98, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1984. "Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation," Working papers 345, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  8. repec:fth:coluec:564 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Economides, Nicholas, 1996. "The economics of networks," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 673-699, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1994. "Systems Competition and Network Effects," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 93-115, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1985. "Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 424-40, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Cabral, Luis M. B. & Salant, David J. & Woroch, Glenn A., 1999. "Monopoly pricing with network externalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 199-214, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jong-Hee Hahn, 2000. "Nonlinear Pricing of Telecommunications with Call and Network Externalities," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 2000/15, Department of Economics, Keele University, revised Nov 2001. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Alexandre Gaudeul, 2004. "Shareware competition: Selling an experience," Game Theory and Information 0409008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Matthew Clements, 2002. "System Components, Network Effects, and Bundling," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1046-1046. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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