Membership has its Privileges - On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally

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Membership has its Privileges - On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally

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Stefan Voigt () (Department of Economics, University of Kassel)

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Stefan Voigt

Abstract

This paper analyzes whether nation-state governments can increase their credibility by becoming members of international organizations. Credibility is an important asset because it determines the real interest rate and is expected to have an important impact on investment and growth. It is hypothesized that the degree of delegation to international organizations can improve the credibility of nation-state governments. This hypothesis is tested by introducing a new indicator. On the basis of 136 countries, various versions of an indicator of international delegation are highly significant for explaining variation in countries’ credibility. The effect of international delegation on credibility is particularly strong among the group of lower income countries (N=60).

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Paper provided by University of Kassel, Institute of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 73/05.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2005
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Handle: RePEc:kas:wpaper:2005-73

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General
F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2005-07-03 (All new papers)
NEP-CDM-2005-07-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
NEP-LAW-2005-07-03 (Law & Economics)
NEP-PBE-2005-07-03 (Public Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Alberto Alesina & Arnaud Devleeschauwer & William Easterly & Sergio Kurlat & Romain Wacziarg, 2002. "Fractionalization," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1959, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Alberto Alesina & Arnaud Devleeschauwer & William Easterly & Sergio Kurlat & Romain Wacziarg, 2003. "Fractionalization," NBER Working Papers 9411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Stefan Voigt & Michael Ebeling & Lorenz Blume, 2004. "Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence - the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," Discussion Papers in Economics 67/04, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Voigt, Stefan & Ebeling, Michael & Blume, Lorenz, 2007. "Improving credibility by delegating judicial competence--the case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 348-373, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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