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Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence - the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

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Author Info
Stefan Voigt () (Department of Economics, University of Kassel and ICER, Torino)
Michael Ebeling () (Department of Economics, University of Kassel)
Lorenz Blume () (Department of Economics, University of Kassel)

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Abstract

It is argued that government credibility is an important resource and that it can be improved by delegating decision-making competence beyond the nation-state. It is hypothesized that such delegation should result in higher income and growth. Some former British colonies retained the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as their final court of appeals even after independence. This court is thus taken as a natural experiment to test our hypothesis. It turns out that retaining the jurisdiction is indeed significant for explaining economic growth.

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File URL: http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb7/ivwl/diskussionsbeitraege/workingpaper/papier6704.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Kassel, Institute of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 67/04.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 82 (2007), Issue 2, pp. 348-373.
Handle: RePEc:kas:wpaper:2004-67

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Related research
Keywords: Credibility Delegation of Competence Judicial Independence Economic History Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
O57 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries
P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-79, April.
    Other versions:
  2. Alberto Alesina & Arnaud Devleeschauwer & William Easterly & Sergio Kurlat & Romain Wacziarg, 2002. "Fractionalization," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1959, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
    Other versions:
  4. Barzel, Y, 1997. "Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution : The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote," Working Papers 97-13, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  5. Stefan Voigt, . "Iudex Calculat: The ECJ's Quest for Power," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2003-1-1066, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  6. Easterly, William & Levine, Ross, 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1203-50, November.
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  7. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-46, October.
  8. Giandomenico Majone, 2001. "Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 127(1), pages 57-, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Barzel, Yoram, 1997. "Parliament as a wealth-maximizing institution: The right to the residual and the right to vote," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 455-474, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Barzel, Y, 1997. "Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution : The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 97-13, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  11. Feld, Lars P. & Voigt, Stefan, 2003. "Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 497-527, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Voigt, Stefan & Salzberger, Eli M, 2002. "Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(2), pages 289-310.
  13. Stefan Voigt, 2005. "Membership has its Privileges - On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally," Discussion Papers in Economics 73/05, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Janina Satzer, . "Increased Heterogeneity as a Cause for Decreased Use of International Courts - the Case of the ICJ," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1152, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  2. Reinhold Kosfeld & Hans-Friedrich Eckey & Jorgen Lauridsen, 2007. "Disparities in Prices and Income Across German NUTS 3 Regions," Discussion Papers in Economics 93/07, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jochen Michaelis, 2007. "Internationaler Handel," Discussion Papers in Economics 91/07, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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