Trade Sanctions and the Incidence of Child Labour
AbstractThis paper presents a general equilibrium model of a small open developing country that exports a range of differentiated products. The products are produced by monopolistic competitive firms using adult and child labour as well as capital. We show that a uniform tariff levied on exports produced with the help of child labour is a failure in terms of reducing child labour. A more effective course of action would be a firm- specifc tarif where the tarif rate varies with the amount of child labour incorporated in a single good. Such an instrument reduces child labour, but nevertheless it is bad even for the children, since it worsens their well-being via lower income and consumption.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Kassel, Institute of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 54/04.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Review of Development Economics, Vol. 11 (2007), pp. 49-62.
child labour; trade policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F16 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J82 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Labor Force Composition
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-02-13 (All new papers)
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