Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information Theoretical and Experimental Results for the "Acquiring-a-Company" Game
AbstractBased on the "acquiring-a-company" game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sell- ers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of information disclosure as prescribed by two recently implemented directives of the European Union, the Transparency and the Takeover-Bid Directive. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest a welfare-enhancing effect of compulsory information disclosure. Hence, the EU Transparency and the EU Takeover-Bid Directive should both be welfare enhancing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2014-003.
Date of creation: 04 Feb 2014
Date of revision:
Acquisition of firms; disclosure of private information; experimental economics;
Other versions of this item:
- Güth, Werner & Pull, Kerstin & Stadler, Manfred & Zaby, Alexandra, 2014. "Compulsory disclosure of private information theoretical and experimental results for the "acquiring-a-company" game," University of Tuebingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance 69, University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences.
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-02-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2014-02-08 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2014-02-08 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2014-02-08 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EUR-2014-02-08 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-EXP-2014-02-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-ORE-2014-02-08 (Operations Research)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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