Sorting via Screening versus Signaling: A Theoretic and Experimental Comparison
AbstractSimilar to Kübler et al. (2008, GEB 64, p. 219-236), we compare sorting in games with asymmetric incomplete information theoretically and experimentally. Rather than distinguishing two very different sequential games, we use the same game format and capture the structural difference of screening and signaling only via their payoff specification. The experiment thus relies on the same verbal instructions. Although the equilibrium outcomes coincide, greater efficiency losses off the equilibrium play due to sorting under signaling, compared to screening, is predicted and confirmed experimentally.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2013-017.
Date of creation: 24 Apr 2013
Date of revision:
sorting; screening; signaling; wage bargaining; off-equilibrium play;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J40 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - General
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- NEP-ALL-2013-05-11 (All new papers)
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- NEP-EXP-2013-05-11 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-05-11 (Game Theory)
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