Third Party Assessments in Trust Problems with Conflict of Interest: An Experiment on the Effects of Promises
AbstractIs it possible to elicit reliable assessment from an assessor with conflict of interest (e.g. a professor that writes a recommendation letter for a formal PhD student)? We propose an experimental test and show that compared to a not-incentivized assessment, a promise to give a truthful assessment reduces misreporting to the same extent as incentivized assessment (i.e. when assessor gain higher payoff if assessment is correct).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2012-067.
Date of creation: 12 Dec 2012
Date of revision:
trust game; communication; cheap-talk; promises; oath;
Other versions of this item:
- Kataria, Mitesh & Winter, Fabian, 2013. "Third party assessments in trust problems with conflict of interest: An experiment on the effects of promises," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 53-56.
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
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