Bargaining with Two-Person-Groups - On the Insignificance of the Patient Partner
AbstractAlthough many real bargaining situations involve more than two people, much of the theoretical and experimental research concentrates on the two player situation. We study the simplest possible extension: four people (two two-person groups) of different patience bargain with each other. Theoretically, only the more patient member of each group should be relevant for the outcome. The less patient members would agree to any outcome and are, hence, irrelevant. We find, however, that the impact of the patient member can be quite small.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2012-043.
Date of creation: 16 Jul 2012
Date of revision:
bargaining experiment; heterogeneous group members;
Other versions of this item:
- Oliver Kirchkamp & Ulrike Vollstädt, 2013. "Bargaining with Two-Person-Groups - On the Insignificance of the Patient Partner," CESifo Working Paper Series 4150, CESifo Group Munich.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-07-23 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-07-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-07-23 (Game Theory)
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