AbstractIn the market where inattentive buyers can fail to notice some feasible choices, the key role of marketing is to make buyers aware of products. However, the eective marketing strategy is often subtle since marketing tactics can make buyers cautious. This paper provides a framework to analyze an eective marketing strategy to persuade an inattentive buyer in an adverse selection environment. We investigate how an attention-grabbing marketing can "backfire" and when it can be eective.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2012-014.
Date of creation: 04 Apr 2012
Date of revision:
Signaling game; Consideration set; Counter signaling; Limited attention; Marketing; Advertising;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-04-17 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2012-04-17 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2012-04-17 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2012-04-17 (Marketing)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"On the strategic use of attention grabbers,"
Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
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"Coarse Thinking and Persuasion,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 123(2), pages 577-619, 05.
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- Yusufcan Masatlioglu & Daisuke Nakajima & Erkut Ozbay, 2009.
NajEcon Working Paper Reviews
- Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2007. "Sequentially Rationalizable Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1824-1839, December.
- Nakajima, Daisuke & Masatlioglu, Yusufcan, 2013. "Choice by iterative search," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
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