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An experiment investigating the spill-over effects of voicing outrage

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  • Anastasios Koukoumelis

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena)

  • M. Vittoria Levati

    ()
    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, and Department of Economics, University of Verona)

Abstract

We report on an experiment designed to explore whether and how anger affects future levels of cooperation. Participants play three consecutive one-shot games. In between two identical two-person public goods games there is a mini dictator game that, depending on the treatment, either gives or does not give the recipient the opportunity to scold the dictator via a text message. We find that the recipients that receive an unfair offer contribute significantly less in the second public goods game. Yet, such contribution cuts are less frequent and notably smaller when messaging is allowed for. We conclude that although anger has a lasting negative effect on cooperation, giving voice to it helps to curtail selfishness.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2012-007.

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Date of creation: 07 Mar 2012
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Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-007

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Keywords: Dictator minigame; Public goods game; Emotions; Cooperation;

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  1. Astrid Hopfensitz & Ernesto Reuben, 2005. "The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-075/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 28 Mar 2006.
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  3. Romer, Paul M., 2000. "Thinking and Feeling," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business 1618, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
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  10. Xiao, Erte & Houser, Daniel, 2009. "Avoiding the sharp tongue: Anticipated written messages promote fair economic exchange," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 393-404, June.
  11. Astrid Hopfensitz & Ernesto Reuben, 2005. "The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-075/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 28 Mar 2006.
  12. Erte Xiao & Daniel Houser, 2005. "Emotion expression in human punishment behavior," Experimental, EconWPA 0504003, EconWPA, revised 18 May 2005.
  13. Noussair, C.N. & Tucker, S., 2005. "Combining monetary and social sanctions to promote cooperation," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-377935, Tilburg University.
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