Gambling for the Upper Hand - Settlement Negotiations in the Lab
AbstractGambling for the Upper Hand - Settlement Negotiations in the Lab
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2011-022.
Date of creation: 19 Apr 2011
Date of revision:
bargaining; litigation; loss aversion; quantal-response equilibrium; settlement;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-04-30 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-04-30 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-04-30 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Yaw Nyarko & Andrew Schotter, 2002. "An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 971-1005, May.
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