Collectively Ranking Candidates - An Axiomatic Approach -
AbstractDifferent evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates since they care more or less for the various qualities of the candidates. It is assumed that all evaluators submit vector bids assigning a monetary bid for each possible rank order. The rules must specify for all possible vectors of such vector bids the collectively binding rank order of candidates and the "payments" for this bid vector and its implied rank order. Three axioms uniquely define the "procedurally fair" ranking rules. We finally discuss how our approach can be adjusted to situations where one wants to rank only acceptable candidates.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2011-020.
Date of creation: 07 Apr 2011
Date of revision:
social ranking; fairness; fair game forms; objective equality; mechanism desig; committee decision making;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-04-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2011-04-16 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2011. "Procedurally Fair Provision of Public Projects An axiomatic characterization," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-016, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Gueth, W. & Peleg, B., 1993. "On Ring Formation in Auctions," Discussion Paper 1993-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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