Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics) M. Vittoria Levati (Max Planck Institute of Economics) Matteo Ploner (Max Planck Institute of Economics)
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We study ultimatum and dictator experiments where the first mover chooses the amount of money to be distributed between the players within a given interval, knowing that her own share is fixed. Thus, the first mover is faced with scarcity, but not with the typical trade-off between her own and the other's payoff. Removing the trade-off inspires significant generosity, which is not affected by the second mover's veto power. On the whole our results con?rm heterogeneity in behavior, but point to efficiency concerns as the predominant motive.
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Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek in its series Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics with number
2009-071.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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