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Making the World a better Place: Experimental evidence from the generosity Game

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  • Werner Güth

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics)

  • M. Vittoria Levati

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics)

  • Matteo Ploner

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics)

Abstract

We study ultimatum and dictator experiments where the first mover chooses the amount of money to be distributed between the players within a given interval, knowing that her own share is fixed. Thus, the first mover is faced with scarcity, but not with the typical trade-off between her own and the other's payoff. Removing the trade-off inspires significant generosity, which is not affected by the second mover's veto power. On the whole our results con?rm heterogeneity in behavior, but point to efficiency concerns as the predominant motive.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2009-071.

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Date of creation: 25 Sep 2009
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Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-071

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Keywords: Ultimatum; Dictator; Social Preferences;

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Cited by:
  1. Haoran He & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Are teams less inequality averse than individuals?," Working Papers halshs-00996545, HAL.
  2. Werner Güth & Martin G. Kocher, 2013. "More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature," CESifo Working Paper Series 4380, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Ben D'Exelle & Els Lecoutere & Bjorn Van Campenhout, 2010. "Social status and bargaining when resources are scarce: Evidence from a field lab experiment," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS), School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 10-09, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  4. Werner Güth & Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler & Agnes Stribeck, 2010. "Equity versus Efficiency? - Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments -," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2010-018, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  5. Pelligra, Vittorio & Stanca, Luca, 2013. "To give or not to give? Equity, efficiency and altruistic behavior in an artefactual field experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 1-9.
  6. Güth, Werner, 2010. "The Generosity Game and calibration of inequity aversion," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 155-157, April.
  7. Agnes Bäker & Werner Güth & Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler, 2010. "Does Entitlement Crowd Out Efficiency or Equality Seeking? - Selling the Roles in Generosity Game Experiments -," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2010-091, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.

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