Distributive fairness in an intercultural ultimatum game
AbstractDoes geographic or (perceived) social distance between subjects signi?cantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects once play an ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and dummy player) and asymmetric information (only the proposer knows what can be distributed). Treatments differ in their geographical scope in that they involve either one or three subject pools which, in the latter case, structurally differ in their between-subject pool heterogeneity. Observed choice behavior corroborates several stylized facts of this class of ultimatum games which are primarily explained by strategic play and other-regarding preferences. While the extent of self-interested allocation behavior in proposers signi?cantly varies across sites, neither proposers nor responders meaningfully condition their choices on their co-players' provenance or affiliation. Altogether, we do not discern articulate discriminative behavior based on geographic or social distance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2008-028.
Date of creation: 27 Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Equity; fairness; social preferences; ultimatum bargaining; redistribution; cross-national experiment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-04-15 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-04-15 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-04-15 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2008-04-15 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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