Listen: I am angry! An experiment comparing ways of revealing emotions
AbstractWe report on an experiment designed to explore whether allowing individuals to voice their anger prevents costly punishment. For this sake, we use an ultimatum minigame and distinguish two treatments: one in which responders can only accept or reject the other, and the other in which they can also scold the proposer. By an unannounced successive two-person public goods game, with either the same partner or a different one, we additionally explore how "having a voice" affects later behavior. The evidence supports the conclusion that voicing one's outrage crowds out the need to harm oneself and the other. Yet, this emotional reaction does not lead to increased future cooperation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2007-096.
Date of creation: 04 Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Ultimatum bargaining; Public goods game; Outrage; Punishment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-12-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-12-08 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2007-12-08 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-12-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-12-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PBE-2007-12-08 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2007-12-08 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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