Rent Sharing and Gender Discrimination in Collegiate Athletics
AbstractIn this paper, we analyze the effect of market power on the share of females in top management positions using data from a market in which some firms have market power due to an institutionalized cartel. We investigate collegiate athletics and interpret coaches as top-level managers or chief executive officers (CEOs). The causal link between market power and female employment is established by exploiting the existence of the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) as an exogenous shock. Our results show that an increase in the market share has a negative effect on females relative to males among coaches. We interpret this as clear evidence for Becker's (1957) theory on employer discrimination. Only firms operating in an oligopolistic or otherwise not perfectly competitive environment can sustain a taste or cost of discrimination. Market power is necessary to let firms share rents with their workers, which they do in a discriminatory way.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria in its series NRN working papers with number 2013-07.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2013
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: NRN Labor Economics and the Welfare State, c/o Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Altenbergerstr. 69, 4040 Linz
Web page: http://www.labornrn.at/
More information through EDIRC
gender discrimination; market power;
Other versions of this item:
- Mario Lackner & Christine Zulehner, 2013. "Rent Sharing and Gender Discrimination in Collegiate Athletics," Economics working papers 2013-09, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-07-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEM-2013-07-15 (Demographic Economics)
- NEP-SPO-2013-07-15 (Sports & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Andrea Weber & Christine Zulehner, 2009.
"Female Hires and the Success of Start-up Firms,"
Ruhr Economic Papers
0151, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
- Weber, Andrea & Zulehner, Christine, 2009. "Female Hires and the Success of Start-up Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 4568, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Andrea Weber & Christine Zulehner, 2009. "Female Hires and the Success of Start-up Firms," NRN working papers 2009-28, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Frank Kleibergen & Richard Paap, 2003.
"Generalized Reduced Rank Tests using the Singular Value Decomposition,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
03-003/4, Tinbergen Institute.
- Kleibergen, Frank & Paap, Richard, 2006. "Generalized reduced rank tests using the singular value decomposition," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 97-126, July.
- Richard Paap & Frank Kleibergen, 2004. "Generalized Reduced Rank Tests using the Singular Value Decomposition," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 195, Econometric Society.
- Kleibergen, F.R. & Paap, R., 2003. "Generalized Reduced Rank Tests using the Singular Value Decomposition," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI 2003-01, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
- E. Woodrow Eckard, 2013. "Is the Bowl Championship Series a Cartel? Some Evidence," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 14(1), pages 3-22, February.
- Judith K. Hellerstein & David Neumark & Kenneth R. Troske, 2002.
"Market Forces and Sex Discrimination,"
Journal of Human Resources,
University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(2), pages 353-380.
- Judith K. Hellerstein & David Neumark & Kenneth R. Troske, 1997. "Market Forces and Sex Discrimination," NBER Working Papers 6321, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Judith K. Hellerstein & David Neumark & Kenneth R. Troske, 1998. "Market Forces and Sex Discrimination," Labor and Demography 9807002, EconWPA.
- Ashenfelter, Orley & Hannan, Timothy, 1986. "Sex Discrimination and Product Market Competition: The Case of the Banking Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 149-73, February.
- Mary Gregory & Sara Connolly, 2008. "Feature: The Price of Reconciliation: Part-Time Work, Families and Women's Satisfaction," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(526), pages F1-F7, 02.
- Kawaguchi, Daiji, 2007. "A market test for sex discrimination: Evidence from Japanese firm-level panel data," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 441-460, June.
- Lawrence M. Kahn, 2007. "Markets: Cartel Behavior and Amateurism in College Sports," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 209-226, Winter.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Who can afford to discriminate against women?
by RenÃ© BÃ¶heim in Econ Tidbits on 2013-07-09 11:28:00
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ren� B�heim).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.