Progressive Ambition Electoral Selection and the Creation of Ideologues
AbstractThe process by which high-level office-holder are selected is shown to result in pure office-seeking politicians looking like ideologues
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics in its series Economics Working Paper Archive with number 419.
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 2000. "Progressive ambition, electoral selection, and the creation of ideologues," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 13-23, 03.
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- Callander, Steven & Wilkie, Simon, 2007. "Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 262-286, August.
- Jose A. Garcia-Martinez, 2010. "The Role of Selectivity in Hierarchical Social Systems," Working Papers 2010-05, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
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