Martin Kloyer () (University of Jena, Faculty of Economics) Roland Helm () (University of Jena, Faculty of Economics)
Abstract
Due to increasing technological complexity of new product development, Contract R&D becomes more important. However, existence and efficiency of Contract R&D supply relations are endangered by specific mutual opportunism possibilities. We show how empirical contract research, a branch of positive Institutional Economics, identifies effective mechanisms of opportunism control for this kind of supply relations. Thus, we do not only provide an approach of dealing with a highly relevant problem of management of technology and innovation. We also demonstrate the potential of the young and promising discipline of empirical contract research that is able to send valuable impulses to normative Institutional Economics as well as to management practice.
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Length: Date of creation: 13 Apr 2007 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in: Technology and Innovation Management. Hrsg. v. R. Meckl, M. Rongping und M. Fanchen. Muenchen 2008, S. 151-165. Handle: RePEc:jen:jenjbe:2007-05
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