There is robust experimental evidence that in the ultimatum game real players often prefer a fair allocation which seems to be in contrast to rational decision making. In this paper rational maximizing behavior as well as norm-guided fair behavior are two possible behavioral rules. It is argued that behavioral rules are adopted according to their expected success before the ultimatum game is played. Using the concept of behavioral equilibrium profiles it is shown that conditional to the information status the players may adopt the fair behavioral rule instead of maximizing. Furthermore, conditions are derived where maximizing and fair behavior are both parts of a behavioral equilibrium profile. Also the relation to the indirect evolutionary approach is discussed.
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Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultïät in its series Working Paper Series B with number
2002-02.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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