Susanne Büchner () (Max-Planck-Institute for Economics) Andreas Freytag () (University of Jena, Faculty of Economics) Luis G. Gonzalez () Werner Güth () (Max-Planck-Institute for Economics)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer) who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider. The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private cost assumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed (betweensubjects treatment) to capture that society is better off if bribes are rare or low. Although bids are lower than predicted, behavior is qualitatively in line with the linear equilibrium prediction. When bribes generate a negative externality, there is a significant increase in the variability of the data.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-Universit�t Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakult�t in its series Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft with number
06/2006.
Order Information: Postal: If a paper is not downloadable, please contact the author(s) or the library of University of Jena, not the archive maintainer.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)