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Bribery and Public Procurement - An Experimental Study

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Author Info

  • Susanne Büchner

    ()
    (Max-Planck-Institute for Economics)

  • Andreas Freytag

    ()
    (University of Jena, Faculty of Economics)

  • Luis G. Gonzalez

    ()

  • Werner Güth

    ()
    (Max-Planck-Institute for Economics)

Abstract

A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer) who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider. The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private cost assumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed (betweensubjects treatment) to capture that society is better off if bribes are rare or low. Although bids are lower than predicted, behavior is qualitatively in line with the linear equilibrium prediction. When bribes generate a negative externality, there is a significant increase in the variability of the data.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät in its series Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft with number 06/2006.

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Date of creation: 15 Jan 2006
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Handle: RePEc:jen:jenasw:2006-06

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Keywords: Corruption; Procurement Auctions;

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References

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  1. Beck, Paul J. & Maher, Michael W., 1986. "A comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-5.
  2. Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000. "Corruption and competition in procurement," Economics Working Papers 464, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2001.
  3. Klaus Abbink, 2006. "Laboratory experiments on corruption," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series archive-38, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  4. Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2000. "Auctions and corruption," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2000,40, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  5. Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1986. "A note on competitive bribery games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 337-341.
  6. Mark Duggan & Steven D. Levitt, 2002. "Winning Isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1594-1605, December.
  7. Gökhan R. Karahan & Laura Razzolini & William F. Shughart II, 2002. "Centralized versus decentralized decision-making in a county government setting," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 101-115, 07.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mikael Priks, 2012. "Competition among officials and the abuse of power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 425-438, March.
  2. Vetter, Stefan, 2012. "Delegation and Rewards," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 378, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  3. Erik O. Kimbrough & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012. "Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict," Working Papers 12-01, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  4. Armin Scholl & Nils Boysen & Malte Fliedner, 2006. "The sequence-dependent assembly line balancing problem," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 18/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  5. Simon Renaud, 2006. "Works Councils and Heterogeneous Firms," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 16/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  6. Simon Renaud, 2006. "Betriebsr�te und Strukturwandel," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 04/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  7. Vetter, Stefan, 2013. "Delegating decision rights for anticipated rewards as an alternative to corruption: An experiment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 188-204.
  8. Jens J. Krüger & Kristina Dreßler, 2006. "Knowledge, Profitability and Exit of German Car Manufacturing Firms," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 15/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  9. Erik O. Kimbrough & Roman Sheremeta, 2010. "Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: Avoiding Conflicts through Side Payments," Working Papers 10-23, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  10. Wolfgang Domschke & Armin Scholl, 2006. "Heuristische Verfahren," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 08/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  11. Axel Dreher & Lars-H. Siemers, 2009. "The nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 245-265, July.
  12. Christoph Engel & Sebastian Goerg & Gaoneng Yu, 2012. "Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_01, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised May 2013.
  13. Jens J. Krüger, 2008. "The Sources Of Aggregate Productivity Growth: Us Manufacturing Industries, 1958-1996," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 405-427, October.
  14. Vetter, Stefan, 2012. "Delegation and Rewards," Discussion Papers in Economics 12884, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  15. Holger Graf & Tobias Henning, 2009. "Public Research in Regional Networks of Innovators: A Comparative Study of Four East German Regions," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(10), pages 1349-1368, December.
  16. Uwe Cantner & Andreas Meder, 2006. "Determinants influencing the choice of a cooperation partner," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 20/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.

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