Voluntary Commitment to Environmental Protection: A Bounded Rationality Approach
AbstractGlobal environmental protection is characterized as a public good. In contrast to the national level where the state is able to regulate external effects, there is a lack of supranational institutions which have enough power to force countries to reduce pollution levels. In spite of the free-riding problem it can nevertheless be observed that countries sometimes commit themselves to contribute to the public good `environmental protection'. The case of the Kyoto protocol for global $CO_2$ reduction demonstrates that some countries make substantial volunatry contributions, but others do not or on a much less level. The paper provides a game-theoretic explanation how the free-riding-problem can be overcome to some extent by voluntary cooperative behavior. It is analysed under which conditions free-riding countries can be motivated to make at least small pollution reduction efforts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät in its series Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft with number 22/2004.
Date of creation: Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Bleischwitz, R., Budzinski, O. (Eds.), Environmental Economics: Institutions, Competition, Rationality.
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-09-30 (All new papers)
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