R&D suppliers who are not compensated according to their preferences are motivated to behave opportunistically. The paper presents empirical findings about these preferences. The investigation is based on the assumption that the probability of a continuous compensation instead of a final payment increases when the negotiation power of the supplier rises. The results confirm this presumption with regard to the power determinants of effective intellectual property rights and the number of cooperation alternatives. In contrast to that: suppliers who control the complementary assets themselves, have no explicit preference.
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Length: Date of creation: Jun 2004 Date of revision: Publication status: Published as "Compensation Preferences of R&D-Suppliers: Some Empirical Results" in: International Journal of Technology Management, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2007), S. 371-387 Handle: RePEc:jen:jenasw:2004-13
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