AbstractDestructive behavior has mostly been investigated by games in which all players have the option to simultaneously destroy (burn) their partners' money. In the destructor game, players are randomly paired and assigned the roles of destructor versus passive player. The destructor player chooses to destroy or not to destroy a share of his passive partner's earnings. The passive partner cannot retaliate. In addition, a random event (nature) destroys a percentage of some passive subject's earnings. From the destructor player's view, destruction is benefit-less, costless, hidden and unilateral. Unilateral destruction diminishes with respect to bilateral destruction studies, but it does not vanish: 15% of the subjects choose to destroy. This result suggests that, at least for some, destruction is intrinsically pleasurable.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain) in its series Working Papers with number 2012/11.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
anti-social behaviour; nastiness; money-burning;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-05-08 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-05-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-05-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-05-08 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jeremy Clark, 2002. "House Money Effects in Public Good Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 223-231, December.
- Abbink, Klaus & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2009.
"The pleasure of being nasty,"
Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 306-308, December.
- Zizzo, D.J. & Oswald, A., 2000.
"Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others' Incomes?,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
568, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Daniel J. ZIZZO & Andrew J. OSWALD, 2001. "Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others'Incomes?," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 63-64, pages 39-65.
- Bosman, Ronald & Sutter, Matthias & van Winden, Frans, 2005. "The impact of real effort and emotions in the power-to-take game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 407-429, June.
- Zizzo, Daniel John, 2003. "Money burning and rank egalitarianism with random dictators," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 263-266, November.
- Klaus Abbink & David Masclet & Matthijs van Veelen, 2011.
"Reference Point Effects in Antisocial Preferences,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- Klaus Abbink & David Masclet & Matthijs van Veelen, 2009. "Reference point effects in antisocial preferences," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 09-03, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (María Aurora Garcia Gallego).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.