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On the Optimal Composition of Committees

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  • Ben-Yashar, Ruth

    ()
    (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Danziger, Leif

    ()
    (Ben Gurion University)

Abstract

This paper derives a simple characterization of how to optimally divide an organization's experts into different decision-making committees. The focus is on many three-member committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. We find that the allocation of experts to committees is optimal if and only if it minimizes the sum of the products of the experts' skills in each committee. As a result, given the experts of any two committees, the product of the experts' skills should be as similar as possible in the two committees, and it is never optimal to have the three worst experts in one committee and the three best experts in another.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 7963.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7963

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Keywords: optimal composition of committees; simple majority rule;

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  1. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2013. "Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 1067-1095, April.
  2. Ben-Yashar, Ruth C & Nitzan, Shmuel I, 1997. "The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 175-86, February.
  3. Bozbay Irem & Dietrich Franz & Peters Hans, 2011. "Judgment aggregation in search for the truth," Research Memorandum 040, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  4. David S Ahn & Santiago Oliveros, 2010. "The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000268, David K. Levine.
  5. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007. "Judgment aggregation without full rationality," Research Memorandum 023, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  6. Ben-Yashar, Ruth & Danziger, Leif, 2011. "Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees," IZA Discussion Papers 5782, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Daniel Berend & Luba Sapir, 2007. "Monotonicity in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem with dependent voters," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 507-528, April.
  8. Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir, 2012. "Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 91-125, June.
  9. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Igal Milchtaich, 2007. "First and second best voting rules in committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 453-486, October.
  10. Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2007. "Deliberative voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 317-338, May.
  11. Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
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