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Fostering Within-Family Human Capital Investment: An Intragenerational Insurance Perspective of Social Security

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Author Info
Barbie, Martin (University of Bonn)
Hagedorn, Marcus (IZA Bonn)
Kaul, Ashok () (IZA Bonn)
Abstract

We develop a general equilibrium stochastic OLG model with heterogenous households. Households differ with respect to their productivity. Productivity depends stochastically on parents' unobservable investment in their child's human capital and an aggregate productivity shock. We introduce a PAYG social security system that conditions benefits on the aggregate wage sum and on the wage of one's child. We analyze the effects of such a social security system on the endogenous distribution of human capital and compare it to real world systems, which typically do not condition benefits on the wages of one's children. We decompose the effects of social security on the investment in human capital into an incentive effect, an insurance effect, a redistributive effect and a general equilibrium effect. Furthermore, we discuss the effects of social security on the long run distribution of human capital. Our approach suggests a novel role for a well-designed social security system: it can foster human capital accumulation and act as intragenerational insurance against human capital risk.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 678.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp678

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Related research
Keywords: human capital formation; social security; intragenerational insurance; heterogenous households;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Gordon, Roger H. & Varian, Hal R., 1988. "Intergenerational risk sharing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 185-202, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Martin Feldstein & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2001. "Social Security," NBER Working Papers 8451, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Feldstein, Martin & Liebman, Jeffrey B., 2002. "Social security," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 32, pages 2245-2324 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Henning Bohn, . "Risk Sharing in a Stochastic Overlapping Generations Economy," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 3-98, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Gabrielle Demange & Guy Laroque, 1999. "Social Security and Demographic Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 527-542, May.
    Other versions:
  5. Smith, Alasdair, 1982. "Intergenerational transfers as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 97-106, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Henning Bohn, 1999. "Social Security and Demographic Uncertainty: The Risk Sharing Properties of Alternative Policies," NBER Working Papers 7030, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. James J. Heckman, 1999. "Policies to Foster Human Capital," NBER Working Papers 7288, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Robert C. Merton, 1983. "On the Role of Social Security as a Means for Efficient Risk Sharing in an Economy Where Human Capital Is Not Tradable," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Aspects of the United States Pension System, pages 325-358 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  9. Andrew B. Abel, . "The Social Security Trust Fund, the Riskless Interest Rate, and Capital Accumulation," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 03-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Enders, Walter & Lapan, Harvey E, 1982. "Social Security Taxation and Intergenerational Risk Sharing," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(3), pages 647-58, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Mookherjee, Dilip, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 433-46, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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