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Unemployment Compensation Finance and Labor Market Rigidity

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Author Info
Cahuc, Pierre () (Université Paris 1-EUREQua, CREST, CEPR and IZA Bonn)
Malherbet, Franck (Université Paris 1-EUREQua and CREST)

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Abstract

The systematic use of experience rating is an original feature of the U.S. unemployment benefit system. In most states, unemployment benefits are financed by taxing firms in proportion to their separations. Experience rating is a way to require employers to contribute to the payment of unemployment benefits they create through their firing decisions. It is striking that experience rating is absent from the unemployment compensation systems of other OECD countries, where benefits are usually financed by taxes on payrolls, paid by employers or employees, and by government contributions (Holmlund, 1998). Is experience rating only adapted to the U.S. labor market? Would it be suitable in other countries? At first glance, it is likely that experience rating is not desirable in many European labor markets characterized by high firing costs. We provide a simple matching model of a rigid labor market including firing costs, temporary jobs and a minimum wage in order to analyze the issue. Our analysis leads us to argue that experience rating is likely to reduce unemployment and to improve the welfare of low skilled workers in France, and more generally for low skilled workers in a typical rigid Continental European labor market.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 581.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2002
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp581

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Related research
Keywords: unemployment benefits; job protection; matching models;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

Cited by:
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  1. Pierre Cahuc & Stéphane Carcillo, 2007. "The Shortcomings of a Partial Release of Employment Protection Laws: The Case of the 2005 French Reform," IMF Working Papers 06/301, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  2. L'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck, 2002. "Unemployment Compensation Finance and Aggregate Employment Fluctuations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3614, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. R.A. de Mooij, 2004. "Towards efficient unemployment insurance in the Netherlands," CPB Memoranda 100, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  4. Javier Ortega & Laurence Rioux, 2007. "On the Extent of Re-Entitlement Effects in Unemployment Compensation," IZA Discussion Papers 2807, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Jian-Ping Zhou, 2006. "Reforming Employment Protection Legislation in France," IMF Working Papers 06/108, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  6. Pierre Cahuc & André Zylberberg, 2008. "Optimum income taxation and layoff taxes," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00255794_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. L'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbe, Franck, 2008. "Employment protection reform in search economies," Les Cahiers de Recherche 910, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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