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New Insights into Conditional Cooperation and Punishment from a Strategy Method Experiment

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  • Cheung, Stephen L.

    ()
    (University of Sydney)

Abstract

This paper introduces new experimental designs to enrich understanding of conditional cooperation and punishment in public good games. The key to these methods is to elicit complete contribution or punishment profiles using the strategy method. It is found that the selfish bias in conditional cooperation is made significantly worse when other players contribute more unequally. Contingent punishment strategies are found to increase with decreasing contributions by the target player and also increasing contributions by a third player. "Antisocial" punishments are not directed specifically toward high contributors, but may be motivated by pre-emptive retaliation against punishment a player expects to incur.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 5689.

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Length: 58 pages
Date of creation: May 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5689

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Keywords: strategy method; public good experiment; conditional cooperation; selfish bias; punishment;

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References

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  1. Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann, 2005. "A Comparative Statics Analysis of Punishment in Public-Good Experiments," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London 05/07, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jun 2005.
  2. Thöni, Christian, 2011. "Inequality Aversion and Antisocial Punishment," Economics Working Paper Series 1111, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
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  5. Martin G. Kocher & Todd L. Cherry & Stephan Kroll & Robert J. Netzer & Matthias Sutter, 2007. "Conditional cooperation on three continents," Working Papers 2007-02, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
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  14. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "The demand for punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 522-542, April.
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  19. Ananish Chaudhuri, 2011. "Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-83, March.
  20. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2011. "The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 375-398, September.
  21. Sugden, Robert, 1984. "Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 772-87, December.
  22. Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Benedikt Herrmann & Christian Thöni, 2009. "Measuring conditional cooperation: a replication study in Russia," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 87-92, March.
  24. Roberto Burlando & Francesco Guala, 2005. "Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 35-54, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Christian Thöni, 2014. "Inequality aversion and antisocial punishment," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 529-545, April.
  2. Urs Fischbacher & Simeon Schudy & Sabrina Teyssier, 2014. "Heterogeneous reactions to heterogeneity in returns from public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 195-217, June.

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