Relational Contracts and the Economic Well-Being of Nations
AbstractInformal long-term relationships and mutual confidence play a crucial role in modern economies in at least two dimensions. First, the performance of firms is strongly affected by their capacity to solve organizational questions effectively and this capacity is apparently strongly related to their ability to maintain informal long-term relationships. Second, countries that are better at maintaining unwritten agreements and where interactions are more strongly guided by a sense of trust fare better in terms of economic welfare than others. This paper provides a simple general equilibrium model which reconciles these two findings: we offer a micro-founded explanation of how the trust that prevails in an economy gets transmitted into higher economic well-being and we thereby highlight the role of managers with low time preference. Our analysis builds on the model of Antràs and Helpman (2004) and a formalization of the notion of relational contracting developed in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 5394.
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2010
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-03 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pol Antràs & Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, 2009.
"Organizations and Trade,"
Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews,
Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 43-64, 05.
- Pol Antràs & Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, 2008. "Organizations and Trade," NBER Working Papers 14262, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban & Antras, Pol, 2009. "Organizations and Trade," Scholarly Articles 3199064, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Antràs, Pol & Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban, 2008. "Organizations and Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6965, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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