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The Link between the Intrinsic Motivation to Comply and Compliance Behavior: A Critical Appraisal of Existing Evidence

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  • Halla, Martin

    ()
    (University of Linz)

Abstract

Recent economic literature emphasizes the importance of moral considerations to explain compliance behavior with respect to underground activities such as tax evasion. A considerable amount of research aims to identify factors that affect the intrinsic motivation to comply. However, the causal link between the intrinsic motivation to comply and actual compliance behavior is not established yet. We provide a discussion of the underlying identification problem and suggest (potentially) feasible empirical strategies to uncover a causal effect.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 4843.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Friedrich Schneider (ed.), The Handbook on the Shadow Economy, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, 375-408
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4843

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Keywords: tax morale; benefit fraud; tax compliance; tax evasion; shadow economy; social norms; benefit morale;

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References

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  1. James Alm & Benno Torgler, 2004. "Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States and in Europe," CREMA Working Paper Series, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) 2004-14, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
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  4. Martin Halla & Mario Lackner & Friedrich G. Schneider, 2009. "An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamics of the Welfare State: The Case of Benefit Morale," NRN working papers, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria 2009-04, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  5. Benno Torgler & Markus Schaffner & Alison Macintyre, 2007. "Tax Compliance, Tax Morale And Governance Quality," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology 225, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
  6. Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider, 2007. "Shadow Economy, Tax Morale, Governance and Institutional Quality: A Panel Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 1923, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996. "Tax Compliance," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  8. Torgler, Benno & Schneider, Friedrich, 2007. "The Impact of Tax Morale and Institutional Quality on the Shadow Economy," IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 2541, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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  10. Guglielmo Barone & Sauro Mocetti, 2011. "Tax morale and public spending inefficiency," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(6), pages 724-749, December.
  11. Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1993. "Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game," Carleton Economic Papers, Carleton University, Department of Economics 93-06, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 1994.
  12. Martin Halla & Friedrich G. Schneider, 2005. "Taxes and Benefits: Two Distinct Options to Cheat on the State?," Economics working papers, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria 2005-05, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  13. Joel Slemrod, 2007. "Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 25-48, Winter.
  14. Bosco, Luigi & Mittone, Luigi, 1997. "Tax Evasion and Moral Constraints: Some Experimental Evidence," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 297-324.
  15. Schneider, Friedrich & Buehn, Andreas & Montenegro, Claudio E., 2010. "Shadow economies all over the world : new estimates for 162 countries from 1999 to 2007," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 5356, The World Bank.
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  21. Gordon, James P. P., 1989. "Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 797-805, April.
  22. Lemieux, Thomas & Fortin, Bernard & Frechette, Pierre, 1994. "The Effect of Taxes on Labor Supply in the Underground Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 231-54, March.
  23. Heinemann, Friedrich, 2007. "Is the Welfare State Self-destructive? A Study of Government Benefit Morale," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 07-029, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  24. Elffers, Henk & Weigel, Russell H. & Hessing, Dick J., 1987. "The consequences of different strategies for measuring tax evasion behavior," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 311-337, September.
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  28. repec:fth:prinin:455 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
  1. Diego Lubian & Luca Zarri, 2011. "Happiness and Tax Morale: an Empirical Analysis," Working Papers, University of Verona, Department of Economics 04/2011, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
  2. Halla, Martin, 2010. "Tax Morale and Compliance Behavior: First Evidence on a Causal Link," IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 4918, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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