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Village Economies and the Structure of Extended Family Networks

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  • Angelucci, Manuela

    ()
    (University of Michigan)

  • De Giorgi, Giacomo

    ()
    (Stanford University)

  • Rangel, Marcos A.

    ()
    (Harris School, University of Chicago)

  • Rasul, Imran

    ()
    (University College London)

Abstract

This paper documents how the structure of extended family networks in rural Mexico relates to the poverty and inequality of the village of residence. Using the Hispanic naming convention, we construct within-village extended family networks in 504 poor rural villages. Family networks are larger (both in the number of members and as a share of the village population) and out-migration is lower the poorer and the less unequal the village of residence. Our results are consistent with the extended family being a source of informal insurance to its members.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 4499.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy . 2009, 9 (1)
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4499

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Keywords: village marginality; migration; extended family network; village inequality;

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Cited by:
  1. Orazio Attanasio & Valérie Lechene, 2013. "Efficient responses to targeted cash transfers," IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies W13/28, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  2. Angelucci, Manuela & De Giorgi, Giacomo & Rangel, Marcos A. & Rasul, Imran, 2009. "Family Networks and School Enrolment: Evidence from a Randomized Social Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 4497, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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