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The Efficient and Fair Approval of "Multiple-Cost - Single-Benefit" Projects under Unilateral Information

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Author Info

  • Kahana, Nava

    ()
    (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Mealem, Yosef

    ()
    (Netanya Academic College)

  • Nitzan, Shmuel

    ()
    (Bar-Ilan University)

Abstract

This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost–single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 4181.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2009, 11 (6), 947 - 960
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4181

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Keywords: single beneficiary; indivisible project; efficient and fair implementation; multiple-cost bearers; unilateral information;

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References

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  1. François Maniquet, 2003. "Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 323-346, October.
  2. Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1991. "Joint Projects without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 259-76, April.
  3. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1990. "Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 285-299, April.
  4. Kwerel, Evan, 1977. "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 595-601, October.
  5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:17:y:2007:i:4:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. John Duggan & Joanne Roberts, 2002. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1070-1078, September.
  7. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1995. "Using markets to allocate pollution permits and other scarce resource rights under limited information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 431-455, July.
  8. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1984. "Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 171-193, July.
  9. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  10. Andrew Yates & Daniel English, 2007. "Citizens' demand for permits and Kwerel''s incentive compatible mechanism for pollution control," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(4), pages 1-9.
  11. JoseHerrero, Maria & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1992. "Implementation via backward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 70-88, February.
  12. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
  13. Mutuswami, Suresh & Winter, Eyal, 2004. "Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 629-644, March.
  14. Bagnoli, Mark & Lipman, Barton L, 1992. " Private Provision of Public Goods Can Be Efficient," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 59-78, July.
  15. Kahana, Nava & Mealem, Yosef & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2008. "A complete implementation of the efficient allocation of pollution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 142-144, November.
  16. Bagnoli, Mark & Lipman, Barton L, 1989. "Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 583-601, October.
  17. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
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