Self-Selection and Earnings of Emigrants from a Welfare State
AbstractFollowing a seminal contribution by Borjas (1987), a large literature has analyzed how income distribution and redistribution are related to immigration to various rich countries. In this paper, we take a look at the other side of the coin. We analyze emigration from Denmark, which is one of the richest and most redistributive European Welfare States. Using comprehensive register data on full population and a unique new representative survey, we analyze whether Danes with relatively high earnings ability favor countries with more unequal income distribution and lower taxes, like the United States.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 4144.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2009
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2009-05-16 (European Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2009-05-16 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MIG-2009-05-16 (Economics of Human Migration)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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