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Institutions, Social Norms, and Bargaining Power: An Analysis of Individual Leisure Time in Couple Households

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Author Info
Datta Gupta, Nabanita () (SFI - Danish National Centre for Social Research)
Stratton, Leslie S. () (Virginia Commonwealth University)

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Abstract

We exploit time use data from Denmark and the United States to examine the impact institutions and social norms have on individuals' bargaining power within a household, hypothesizing that the more generous social welfare system and more egalitarian social norms in Denmark will mitigate the impact standard economic power measures have upon couples' time use. Further we posit that leisure time will be more sensitive to power considerations than housework time which may be more influenced by preferences regarding household public goods, to gendered notions of time use, and to censoring. Our results are generally supportive of these hypotheses, with leisure time on non-work days in the US being particularly responsive to economic power. In addition, we find some evidence that institutions matter as women in the US who are more likely to receive welfare benefits enjoy more leisure time than would be suggested by their economic power alone.

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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3773.

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Date of creation: Oct 2008
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3773

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Related research
Keywords: leisure; power; time use; institutions; norms;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-67, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Robert A. Pollak, 2005. "Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production," NBER Working Papers 11239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jean Kimmel & Rachel Connelly, 2007. "Mothers’ Time Choices: Caregiving, Leisure, Home Production, and Paid Work," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 42(3). [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. van Klaveren, Chris & van Praag, Bernard M. S. & Maassen van den Brink, Henriette, 2008. "A Public Good Version of the Collective Household Model: An Empirical Approach with an Application to British Household Data," IZA Discussion Papers 3274, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Michael Burda & Daniel S. Hamermesh & Philippe Weil, 2007. "Total Work, Gender and Social Norms," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2007-058, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Hélène Couprie, 2007. "Time allocation within the Family: Welfare implications of life in a couple," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(516), pages 287-305, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2002. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 37-72, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. van der Lippe, Tanja & Siegers, Jacques J, 1994. "Division of Household and Paid Labour between Partners: Effects of Relative Wage Rates and Social Norms," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 109-36.
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  10. Shoshana Grossbard & Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, 2007. "Cohort-Level Sex Ratio Effects on Women’s Labor Force Participation," IZA Discussion Papers 2722, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  11. Michael Bittman & Paula England & Nancy Folbre & George Matheson, 2001. "When Gender Trumps Money: Bargaining and Time in Household Work," JCPR Working Papers 221, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
  12. AbdelRahmen El Lahga & Nicolas Moreau, 2007. "The Effects of Marriage on Couples’ Allocation of Time Between Market and Non-Market Hours," IZA Discussion Papers 2619, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  13. Shelly Lundberg & Elaina Rose, 1998. "The Determinants of Specialization Within Marriage," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0048, Department of Economics at the University of Washington. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1994. "Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 132-37, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-58, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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