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Institutions, Social Norms, and Bargaining Power: An Analysis of Individual Leisure Time in Couple Households

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  • Datta Gupta, Nabanita

    ()
    (Aarhus University)

  • Stratton, Leslie S.

    ()
    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

Abstract

We exploit time use data from Denmark and the United States to examine the impact institutions and social norms have on individuals' bargaining power within a household, hypothesizing that the more generous social welfare system and more egalitarian social norms in Denmark will mitigate the impact standard economic power measures have upon couples' time use. Further we posit that leisure time will be more sensitive to power considerations than housework time which may be more influenced by preferences regarding household public goods, to gendered notions of time use, and to censoring. Our results are generally supportive of these hypotheses, with leisure time on non-work days in the US being particularly responsive to economic power. In addition, we find some evidence that institutions matter as women in the US who are more likely to receive welfare benefits enjoy more leisure time than would be suggested by their economic power alone.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3773.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Review of Economics of the Household, 2010, 8 (3), 325-343
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3773

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Keywords: institutions; time use; power; leisure; norms;

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References

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  1. Chiappori, P.A., 1989. "Collective Labour Supply and Welfare," DELTA Working Papers 89-07, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  2. Chris van Klaveren & Bernard M.S. van Praag & Henriette Maassen van den Brink, 2008. "A Public Good Version of the Collective Household Model: An Empirical Approach with an Application to British Household Data," CESifo Working Paper Series 2190, CESifo Group Munich.
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  4. Shelly Lundberg & Elaina Rose, 1998. "The Determinants of Specialization Within Marriage," Working Papers 0048, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  5. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 2001. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply," Cahiers de recherche 0103, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  6. van der Lippe, Tanja & Siegers, Jacques J, 1994. "Division of Household and Paid Labour between Partners: Effects of Relative Wage Rates and Social Norms," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 109-36.
  7. Michael Bittman & Paula England & Nancy Folbre & George Matheson, 2001. "When Gender Trumps Money: Bargaining and Time in Household Work," JCPR Working Papers 221, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
  8. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1994. "Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 132-37, May.
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  10. Apps, Patricia & Rees, Ray, 2007. "Cooperative Household Models," IZA Discussion Papers 3127, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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  14. Shoshana Grossbard & Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, 2008. "Cohort-level sex ratio effects on women’s labor force participation," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 309-309, September.
  15. Burda, Michael C & Hamermesh, Daniel S & Weil, Philippe, 2007. "Total Work, Gender and Social Norms," CEPR Discussion Papers 6232, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Eric J. Solberg & David C. Wong, 1992. "Family Time Use: Leisure, Home Production, Market Work, and Work Related Travel," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 27(3), pages 485-510.
  17. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
  18. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Domenico Tabasso, 2011. "With or Without You: Hazard of Divorce and Intra-household Allocation of Time," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2011n07, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
  2. Tabasso, Domenico, 2010. "With or Without You: Divorce Rates and Intra-Household Allocation of Time," IZA Discussion Papers 5292, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Domenico Tabasso, 2009. "With or Without You: Time Use Complementarities and Divorce Rate in the US," Economics Discussion Papers 674, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  4. Oreffice, Sonia, 2014. "Culture and Household Decision Making: Balance of Power and Labor Supply Choices of US-born and Foreign-born Couples," IZA Discussion Papers 7997, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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